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I.  Introduction 
 
 Concern over the rate of spatial growth of urban areas has become a significant national 
political issue and a major development issue in many urban areas.  An often cited statistic, 
typically presented as evidence of sprawl, is that between 1960 and 1990 the urban population in 
the United States increased by 50 percent while the amount of developed land more than doubled 
(Benefield et al., 1999). 
 While much has been written about the causes and consequences of sprawl, little 
attention has been paid to the implications of sprawl for the finances of state and local 
government.  There are at least two possible channels for sprawl to affect the finances of state 
and local governments.  First, if the causes of sprawl include market failures or government 
policies, there may be a role for governmental corrective action.  Second, sprawl may affect the 
costs of and revenue sources for the public provision of goods and services.  This paper 
considers the potential effects that sprawl might have on the finances of state and local 
governments and the possible policies that might be adopted to address the causes and 
consequences of sprawl.   
 The paper is organized as follows: first we discuss what is meant by sprawl and how 
pronounced it is (Section II).  We then discuss possible causes of sprawl (Section III) and turn in 
Section IV to the consequences of sprawl for state and local government expenditures and 
revenues.  In Section V we consider the pressures to address sprawl faced by state and local 
governments and the fiscal policies that they might choose to adopt to address sprawl and its 
consequences.  We conclude in Section VI. 
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II.  What is sprawl and how extensive is it? 
While the news coverage and public dialogue of sprawl would suggest it is a new issue or 
force, it is certainly not a new concept.   Hess et al. (2001), for example, found the concept used 
as early as 1938 by Buttenheim and Cornick (1938).  Despite its age, there is no consensus 
definition of sprawl. 
A. What is sprawl? 
Some individuals associate sprawl with any expansion of the developed land of an urban 
area.  But, in metropolitan areas with growing populations it would only be normal for additional 
land development to occur to accommodate the larger population.   
Burchell et al. (1998), as an outcome of their extensive review of the literature, suggest 
that sprawl needs to be viewed as having many of ten characteristics, including low density, 
leapfrog development, and widespread commercial strip development (p. 124).  Galster et al. 
(2000) review the literature on sprawl and find that the definitions of sprawl can be grouped into 
six general categories.  Based on their review of the literature, they propose that sprawl be 
defined as  a pattern of land use that exhibits some combination of eight distinct dimensions 
including low density, discontinuity of development, and little open space within the urban area. 
For our purposes, we consider development patterns to be economically efficient if they 
are produced by a perfectly competitive market in the absence of distortions created by 
externalities or public policies.  Sprawl, then, is a situation in which such distortions exist and 
the result is an urbanized area that is larger and a population density that is lower than are 
socially desirable. 
B.  The magnitude of sprawl 
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While we consider sprawl to be a situation in which expansion of the urbanized area is 
“excessive,” measuring sprawl according to this concept would be exceedingly difficult.  Most 
authors measure the degree of sprawl as some variant of density.  Dye and McGuire (2000), for 
example, consider four measures: share of the population outside the urban core relative to the 
total population of the metropolitan area, the share of urbanized land area relative to total land 
area of the metropolitan area, the annual growth in urbanized land area, and the population 
density of the suburban area relative to the population density of the total metropolitan area.  Dye 
and McGuire examined over one hundred large metropolitan areas and found that the mean share 
of total land area that lies in the Census-defined urbanized land area (population density greater 
than 1,000 persons per square mile) increased from 0.07 in 1970 to 0.14 in 1990, indicating that 
the share of land in these metropolitan areas that was highly developed had doubled. 
Galster et al. (2000) applied their definition to 13 metropolitan areas and ranked them 
from least sprawling to most sprawling.  The resulting ranking, from least to most sprawling is: 
New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, Washington, 
D.C., Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Miami, and Atlanta. 
A recent report from the Brookings Institution (Fulton et al., 2001) considers an area as 
sprawling if the consumption of land increases faster than population.  Between 1982 and 1997, 
they found that urbanized land in the United States increased 47 percent, while the U.S. 
population increased 17 percent (p. 4).1  Metropolitan density declined from 5.00 persons per 
urbanized acre in 1982 to 4.22 persons per urbanized acre in 1997, or by 15.6 percent.  Table 1 
                                                          
1 They use urbanized land as estimated by the National Resources Inventory, not urbanized area as 
measured by the Bureau of the Census. 
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shows the distribution of changes in density in metropolitan areas.  All but 16 of the 281 
metropolitan areas in their sample experienced declines in density. 
Fulton et al. calculated the ratio of the percentage change in urbanized land divided by 
the percentage change in population, with higher values of this ratio implying greater sprawl.  
Ranking regions from least to most sprawling yields the following order: West, South, Midwest, 
and Northeast; the ratios are, respectively, 1.52, 2.68, 4.54, and 5.67 (Table 2).  This result runs 
counter to what we believe to be the common perception, that is, that sprawl is an issue in the 
south and west.  This perception is due, no doubt, to the fact that the metropolitan areas of the 
south and west have experienced relatively fast population growth.  While land consumption for 
development in the Midwest and Northeast has been small in absolute terms, it has been large 
relative to population growth. 
Viewing sprawl as some combination of a decrease in population density, an expansion 
of developed land area, and an emptying out of the center in favor of the periphery, we present in 
Table 3 descriptive statistics for the twenty largest urbanized areas and their corresponding 
metropolitan areas.  We divide the twenty cities into ten “rust belt” cities (located in the midwest 
and the northeast) and ten “sun belt” cities (located in the south and the west). 
The rust belt cities all experienced greater expansions of their urbanized land areas than 
of their urban populations between 1960 and 1990, resulting in declines in their population 
densities.  These metropolitan areas also uniformly experienced declines in their central city 
populations over this period.2Population data for 2000 indicate that many central cities in these 
metropolitan areas experienced a turn around in the decade of the 1990s.  The central city population 
growth rate was positive for New York, Chicago, Boston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul.   These cities are 
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not the ones that come immediately to mind when the topic is sprawl.  Nonetheless, from St. 
Louis to Baltimore, the cities of the northeast and the mid-west experienced some of the classic 
symptoms of sprawl over the thirty-year period: declining population density, much more rapid 
population growth on the periphery relative to the center, and growth of the developed land area. 
The sun belt cities’ experiences were more variable, still there were some remarkable 
contrasts with the rust belt cities.  First, population increased faster than the urbanized land area 
in half of the sun belt cities, resulting in an increase in population density for these metropolitan 
areas.  In addition, several metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, 
Phoenix, and San Diego) witnessed robust growth in the population of their central cities, both 
absolutely and in comparison to their suburbs.  Among the sun belt cities, the experience of 
Atlanta, the poster child for sprawl, was the most similar to the rust belt cities: declining 
population density and an emptying out of the center relative to the periphery. 
 
III.  Causes of sprawl  
Forces driving land use patterns can be categorized into three groups: factors increasing 
the demand for land at the urban fringe, market failures, and public policies.  
A.  Factors increasing the demand for land at the urban fringe 
In simple terms, land at the urban fringe is demanded by farmers and by developers.3By 
developers we mean anyone wanting to acquire land in order to build housing or commercial or industrial 
facilities.  The more productive is land in agricultural use, the greater its value to farmers, and 
thus the higher the price developers will have to pay to acquire the land.  To the extent that 
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demand for development increases, it is expected that developers will bid away more land from 
agricultural uses.  
There are three main economic forces affecting the demand for land and thus the 
development of land on or beyond the fringe of urban areas: population growth, rising income, 
and falling commuting costs (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993; Brueckner, 2001b, 2000).  In 
addition, changes in communication technology may have reduced the importance of spatial 
proximity in production, thereby increasing the demand for land on the urban fringe. 
Population growth  
Certainly, as population increases, additional land will be absorbed to accommodate this 
growth.  Between 1980 and 2000, the population of metropolitan areas increased by 27.4 percent.  
Thus, assuming no change in density, land used for urban development would have increased by 
27.4 percent. 
Rising income 
Rising household income increases the demand for most goods, including land and 
housing.  Thus, even in the absence of population growth, growth in income will lead households 
to occupy larger tracts of land.   Empirical studies suggest that the income elasticity of the 
demand for housing size is 0.46 (O’Sullivan, 2000, p. 392), while the income elasticity of 
demand for the land component of housing services has been estimated to be 0.32 (Witte et al. 
1979).  Margo (1992) finds that 40 percent of suburbanization between 1950 and 1980 can be 
explained by increases in household income. 
Falling commuting costs 
Automobiles and the development of the interstate highway system substantially reduced 
the cost of commuting by increasing speed and thus reducing the time it takes to travel between 
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residence and work place.  This allowed individuals to live further from their place of work.  
Evidence of these trends is found in the Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1997).  The survey, conducted in 1990, found that between 1983 
and 1990 commuting distance in suburban areas increased about 27 percent, while commuting 
speed increased 16 percent.  For central city areas, commuting distance increased 20 percent and 
commuting speeds increased by 26 percent (pp. 154-155).  This increased speed can be attributed 
to an increase in highway capacity through construction of more urban freeways and improved 
transportation technology, but also a shift away from slower public transit and an increase in less 
congested reverse commuting.  The increase in speed should lead households to be willing to live 
further from their work site and to pay more for a residential tract at the urban fringe.  Hence, 
developers will outbid farmers for land on the urban fringe and hence will acquire more 
agricultural land. 
Brueckner and Fansler (1983) provide some evidence that existing levels of density are a 
result of these market forces.  Consistent with what we argued above they predict that the size of 
an urban spatial area should be related positively to population and income and negatively to 
transportation costs and the price of land at the urban fringe.  They find empirical support for 
their predictions; metropolitan areas with larger populations, higher incomes, lower 
transportation costs, and lower values of agricultural land occupy greater amounts of land. 
Changes in communication technology 
Another possible cause of the change in land use patterns is a decline in the importance of 
spatial proximity.  Historically for many industries it was thought that a company would be more 
productive if it located in close proximity with other businesses in the industry.  Likewise, it was 
thought that productivity would be higher if the divisions of a firm were located at the same site.  
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Some have speculated that improvements in communications (faxes, e-mail, internet, cell 
phones, etc.) may have reduced the importance of spatial proximity for firm productivity.  Thus, 
just as manufacturing firms could seek suburban and ex-urban sites when they were no longer 
tied to rivers for power or railroads for transportation, it may be less important for firms and their 
divisions to be as spatially close to other firms.  The result is that many firms and divisions are 
no longer restricted to major commercial centers, and thus have become more dispersed.   There 
is anecdotal evidence that many firms have moved back-office functions out of the central city, 
but there is little systematic evidence as to the magnitude of the importance of changing 
communication technology on the spatial proximity of firms.4Glaster and Kahn (2001) discuss the 
decentralization of industry in urban areas. 
B. Market failures 
As long as the land market is perfectly competitive, economists argue that the pattern of 
development and the amount of land that is developed is efficient and thus there should be no 
concern about sprawl.  To the extent that market distortions exist, however, the amount of  urban 
land developed may be excessive or the pattern of development may be inefficient. 
An important market imperfection is that open space on the fringe of urban areas may 
have value beyond its private value.  Society may value the diversity of species and ecosystems 
associated with open space, the contribution of open space to clean air and water, and the 
potential uses of open space for public parks and rights-of-way.  In the presence of such external 
benefits, the market price for land on the urban fringe is too low and more land will be converted 
from open space/agricultural use to urban-development use than is socially optimal. 
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Another important market failure results from individuals making choices about 
commuting based on the private costs of travel.  However, when a car enters the transportation 
network during rush hour, it slows the flow of traffic thereby increasing the time other drivers 
have to spend commuting.  In addition, cars generate air pollution, which imposes additional 
costs on others.  Commuters do not bear these congestion and pollution costs that they impose on 
others, and hence have no incentive to consider these costs when they make commuting 
decisions.  Because individuals do not consider the full cost of using their cars, they will live 
further from their work site and commute further than is optimal.  The result is lower density 
than is optimal. 
C.  Public policies 
There are several ways in which public policies affect land use patterns.  First, there are 
various subsidy programs that encourage low-density development.  The federal income tax 
system provides a substantial incentive for owner-occupied housing; the resulting lower effective 
price of housing services encourages larger lots and homes.   
Public infrastructure is also subsidized.  Federal subsidizes in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 
1980s meant that the price that developers paid for infrastructure was less than marginal cost, 
and thus geographic expansion was encouraged.  Transportation, both mass transit and interstate 
highways, is also heavily subsidized, leading to a more extensive transportation network than 
may be efficient. The result is to lower the cost of transportation, which encourages longer 
commutes.   
Governments typically fail to charge developers the full cost of public infrastructure 
needed to serve new developments.  An issue that has received a great deal of attention is the 
additional cost of the infrastructure needed to serve less dense development patterns.  To the 
 9
extent that the cost of infrastructure and service delivery are negatively related to density and 
that these costs are not fully borne by the new development, there is an incentive for 
development to be less dense than is efficient.  In most urban areas, infrastructure and public 
services are paid for through property taxes levied on all property.  Thus, the pricing of 
infrastructure is averaged over all property taxpayers and therefore the infrastructure cost of 
development paid by the new development is less than the marginal cost of the public 
infrastructure.  Furthermore, since land being developed on the fringe of the urban area 
commands a lower price than in the more centralized and previously developed areas, property 
tax financing of infrastructure for new development results in an infrastructure price that is even 
lower than the average across all properties.  This provides an incentive for less dense 
development and for extending the urban fringe.5 
The use of property taxes results in less dense development than if a non-distortionary tax 
was used to finance public services.  The property tax is levied on land and buildings, so 
compared to a pure land tax, the property tax results in development that is less land intensive 
(Nechyba, 1998).  Brueckner (2001a) explores this issue by considering an urban area with a 
fixed population within a standard urban model and shows that the property tax leads to sprawl, 
i.e, a decrease in overall density resulting from an expansion of the urban area beyond what is 
economically efficient in order to accommodate the fixed population. 
Another public policy associated with sprawl is government regulation of land use.  
Suburban land use is dominated by zoning and subdivision ordinances that have substantial 
                                                          
5 
Brueckner (2001a) explores the effect on spatial form of charging developers a tax equal to the average 
cost of infrastructure rather than the marginal cost. 
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effects on land use.  Zoning and subdivision ordinances frequently require large lots, discourage 
multi-family housing, and mandate large parking lots for commercial and retailing 
developments.6 
The existence of a large number of municipalities allows individuals a wide range of 
public services packages from which to choose, and the inter-jurisdictional competition that 
results encourages governments to be more efficient.  However, the greater the number of local 
governments within an urban area, the greater the competition for property tax base.  To the 
extent that communities on or beyond the urban fringe use incentives to encourage and promote 
the development of land before it otherwise would be efficient, tax base compeititon leads to an 
expansion of the urban area beyond what would be driven by market forces.  In addition, the 
greater the number of local governments, the more difficult it is to adopt policies that might 
control sprawl because of the problems that arise in coordinating policies across a large numbers 
of jurisdictions.  Fulton et al. (2001) find that sprawl is associated with metropolitan areas in 
which the average population of local governments is smaller.  Dye and McGuire (2000) find 
that sprawl is positively associated with the number of local governments in an area.   
                                                          
6 
Leinberger (1998) claims that a neighborhood commercial center will “always be built on a 12- to 15-acre 
site, with 20 percent of space set aside for building and the remaining 80 percent dedicated to parking (p. 
36).”  He also claims that for every 1,000 square feet of office space, 1,500 square feet of parking will be 
provided, and for every 1,000 square feet of restaurant seating space, parking will require 3,500 square 
feet. 
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 IV.  The effects of sprawl and consequences for state and local governments finances 
As Ewing (1994) points out, it is not sprawl itself that is undesirable, but the negative 
impacts associated with sprawl.  The extensive literature survey by Burchell et al. (1998) 
uncovered 27 alleged negative impacts of sprawl and 14 alleged positive impacts.  Conflicting 
arguments can be found in the literature regarding several of the suggested effects of sprawl; for 
example, there is research alleging that sprawl increases commuting times and other research 
alleging that it reduces commuting times.  For many of the alleged effects, there is little evidence 
demonstrating a causal relationship with sprawl. 
In this section we explore how sprawl might be expected to affect the expenditures and 
revenues of state and local governments.  In Section V we consider the policies that state and 
local governments might consider to address sprawl. 
A.  Increased cost of public infrastructure  
It is commonly argued that less dense development results in a higher cost of providing 
public infrastructure.   
Highway and street networks 
Consider the effect of density on the cost of providing a commuter highway network.  
Consider two cities of radius r and 2r, each with the same population evenly distributed over the 
space of the city and with all employment located at the center.  The density in the larger city 
will be 1/4 the density of the smaller city.  Suppose that the highway system starts at the edge of 
the city and expands as it reaches the center of the city in order to handle the increasing number 
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of drivers.  Essentially, the highway system will be shaped like a set of cones.  If the radius of 
the city doubles, the size of the cone, i.e., the number of lane miles, will also double.7   
The neighborhood streets required to get commuters to the highways will also have to 
increase.  If the density of neighborhood streets in the city with radius 2r has to be the same as in 
the city of radius r, then the miles of neighborhood streets will have to be 4 times as large in the 
city of radius 2r as in the city of radius r.8   
These calculations are based on the assumption that all commutes are to the center of the 
city.  If sprawl also results in a dispersal of employment locations, then sprawl might not result 
in longer commutes or reduced accessibility.  However, actual development patterns have 
separated trip destinations such as residence, employment, and shopping, and thus commuting 
distances have increased over time.  The Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey, conducted 
in 1990, found that the average distance traveled each day was 29 miles, an increase from 26 
miles in 1977, and from about 24 miles in 1969 (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1997, p. 
148).   
Public transit 
To be cost effective, public transit requires high residential and employment densities in 
order to generate sufficient trips.  In addition, public bus transit is more cost effective if the bus 
lines can be focused on a limited set of destinations, such as a central business district (CBD).  
Even if employment remains in the CBD, a less dense population requires longer bus routes to 
                                                          
7 
The size of the cone will be rM/2, where r is the radius and M is the width of the road at the center of the 
city.  M is the same regardless of r for a given population.  Doubling r doubles the size of the cone. 
8 
The area of the city is πr2.  So doubling r, quadruples the area. 
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collect the same volume of riders.  Thus, if sprawl results in lower population density and in 
numerous and widely dispersed employment centers, then public transit becomes a more costly 
option.  
Water and sewer lines  
The cost of water and sewer lines will also increase with lower density.  Consider a 
square city subdivided into B square blocks of length L, with lots fronting all sides of the block.   
Assume that there must be one water line and one sewer line under every street, i.e., one line can 
serve houses on both sides of the street.  Consider an alternative city with the same population 
and block size, but with lot sizes that are twice as big; density in the new city will be half of what 
it was in the old city and the number of blocks will double.  The total distance of  the water and 
sewer lines that have to be installed in the new city will be slightly less than twice what it was in 
the more dense city.9  The implication is that the cost of installing and maintaining water and 
sewer lines will nearly double. 
Existing studies 
The above calculations assume that all commutes are to the center of the urban area and 
that block sizes are fixed.  An alternative approach to exploring the relationship between land use 
patterns and infrastructure is to consider the effect of alternative development patterns on the 
cost of infrastructure.  The Office of Technology Assessment (U.S. Congress, 1995), for 
example, estimated that sprawl increased the cost of infrastructure from 10 percent to 20 percent.  
                                                          
9 
The percentage increase in the miles of water and sewer lines will approach the percentage increase in the 
number of blocks as the number of blocks approaches infinity.   
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It cited one study that found that the cost of providing infrastructure for a house in a scattered, 
outlying development was 40 percent higher than for a house in the core area of the city.  
Burchell (1997) estimated the future infrastructure cost required by the growth in South 
Carolina for the period 1995 to 2015, and argued that if current development patterns continue, 
statewide infrastructure costs will be $56 billion, or $750 per person per year, half of which 
would be for road construction.  He estimated that about 10 percent of this could be saved by 
adopting a more compact development pattern; most of the infrastructure cost is related to 
growth, regardless of the pattern of development.    
The State of the Cities 1999 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
1999) reported that, “Road costs are 25 percent to 33 percent higher and utility costs are 18 
percent to 25 percent higher in communities marked by sprawl than in sprawl-free communities.” 
These types of studies are not without flaws.  For example, Altshuler and Gómez-IbáZez 
(1993) point out that studies of fiscal impacts of alternative development patterns do not always 
use appropriate cost concepts or measures.  Some of these studies assume that different 
residential density will lead to different household demographics, thereby confounding the 
effects on infrastructure costs of different densities with the effects of different demographics.  
Furthermore, the studies usually assume no difference in the level of service or in the technology 
used across developments of different densities.  However, at low density streets could be 
narrower since there will be less traffic, and sidewalks could be built on only one side of the 
street since there will be fewer pedestrians. 
B.  Increased operation costs 
There are several public services whose costs are likely to increase with lower density.  
Consider communities with the same population (both in size and characteristics) and the same 
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quality of public services, but with different densities. To maintain the same quality the response 
times for police, fire, and EMS need to be the same for both densities.  Lower density will 
require more fire stations to ensure the same response time.  There will have to be more police 
patrols to ensure the same response time and that each house and commercial building get 
patrolled the same number of times.  Since traffic congestion will be less when density is less, 
the percentage increase in costs should be less than the percentage decrease in density.   
The costs of collecting solid waste, of street cleaning, and of snow plowing could also be 
higher.  Garbage collection costs vary directly with distance (and speed) between pickup stops 
and the amount of trash collected.   Since the later will not change with density, the costs will not 
increase at the same rate that density decreases.  Street cleaning and snow removal, however, 
vary in proportion to the miles of road.  As noted above, the number of miles of roads could 
increase at close to the same percentage that density falls.   With lower density, however, there 
will be fewer cars per mile of road to interfere with the operations, which should increase speed.  
Sprawl should have little effect on the costs of other services.  Assuming that park space 
is the same regardless of density, the cost of parks and recreation should be unaffected, although 
land prices may be higher with higher density.  On the other hand, with larger residential lots, the 
demand for public parks may be reduced.  Education, other than the cost of transporting students, 
is also unlikely to be affected by density.   Likewise, there is no reason to expect that the costs of  
functions such as courts, jails, and general government would be affected by density. 
Increased density may change the characteristics of the community in ways other than 
geographic size, ways that might increase the costs of public provision.  Denser cities may have 
taller buildings and more congestion, both of which increase the cost of providing certain public 
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services, and there is a greater likelihood that fires might spread to surrounding buildings, so that 
more fire protection is needed.  
Empirical studies of the cost of service provision suggest that per capita service costs are 
U-shaped with respect to density (Ladd 1998).  In such studies it is difficult to sort out the direct 
effect of density from the effect of other factors such as population characteristics associated 
with denser cities.  However, if all cities were to be more dense, presumably there would be no 
additional sorting of individuals across cities based on factors associated with higher density, and 
thus the demographics of the cities would not change. 
C.  Property taxes 
Sprawl will have an effect on the property tax base and the effect may differ by the 
geographic location of the jurisdiction.  Suppose that the price of land at the edge of the urban 
area decreases.  Assume that the urban population does not change and that there are no other 
distortions.  Within the context of a standard monocentric urban model the decrease in the price 
of land at the urban fringe will cause the urban area to expand.  It is easy to show that the land-
value gradient will shift down and will equal the new, lower price of undeveloped land at a 
greater distance from the city center.  The result is that within the original urban area, the total 
value of land will fall, and thus, the land value of the property tax base will fall.   Because there 
is more land within the now expanded urban area, the total land value could increase.   
Since the price of land has fallen, the production of goods and services will become less 
capital intensive, meaning that the total value of improvements should also fall.  Furthermore, 
some of the existing capital should be relocated to the previously undeveloped land. Unless the 
income effect from the fall in land prices results in a substantial increase in the demand and 
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hence production of local goods and services, including housing, the total value of the property 
tax base within the pre-existing urban area will fall.    
The second aspect of the change in the value of the property tax base is how the change 
will be distributed across the urban area.  Without putting some structure on the utility function 
in the monocentric model, the model does not yield a definite prediction regarding the 
percentage change in land value across the urban area.  However, it is a common perception that 
commercial and industrial development is more dispersed with sprawl.  Rather than all non-
residential property located in the CBD or in a few nodes, under sprawl this property will likely 
be distributed more uniformly across the urban area.  This will provide more suburban 
jurisdictions with non-residential property tax base and decrease the property tax base in the 
central city. 
We crudely explored this issue by investigating how the distribution of the property tax 
base changed over time as the Atlanta urban area expanded.   We estimated a property tax 
gradient for 1970 and for 1999 using as the unit of observation per capita property tax base, at 
the county level, for the 20-county Atlanta MSA.  If sprawl reduces density and extends the 
boundaries of the urbanized area, then the gradient should become flatter with sprawl.  However, 
we found the value of the gradient became slightly steeper, although the change was not 
statistically significant.  
D.  Quality of life 
There are many ways that sprawl affects the quality of life.  State and local governments 
may be called upon to address these consequences of sprawl. 
Central city costs  
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To the extent that sprawl is the result of migration of central city residents to more distant 
suburbs, there are clear implications for the central city.  Central cities have fixed infrastructure 
that has to be maintained.  With out-migration of central city residents to the suburbs, the 
remaining central city residents will each have to bear a greater share of these maintenance costs.  
Furthermore, if the households who move to the suburbs are higher income households, then the 
tax base per capita in the central part of the urban area will likely decrease.   
Environmental problems 
Sprawl is also associated with environmental issues.  Longer commutes associated with 
low density development contribute to air pollution.  Low density development also increases 
water runoff since the larger the land area that is covered, the greater the water runoff.  For 
example, parking lots generate almost 16 times as much runoff as undeveloped land.  Sprawling 
low-rise shopping centers and office parks increase the land that is paved and therefore the 
amount of runoff (Hirschhorn, 2000).  The result is increased costs of waste water treatment and 
greater health care costs from air pollution.   
Psychic costs 
Authors have also associated sprawl with psychic costs such as unaesthetic development 
and loss of community.   Many authors decry the proliferation of strip malls and big box stores. 
Some authors associate the traditional suburban subdivision with an increase in the isolation of 
households, leading to a loss of community.  It is argued that this loss of community is 
compounded by the increased time spent in automobiles commuting to work and running 
errands.  To the extent that this is true, it may reduce the time individuals spend volunteering in 
the community and increase the need for local governments to take on the functions that the 
volunteers would otherwise have performed. 
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 V.  Possible state and local policies to address sprawl 
Growing concerns about sprawl and its consequences have pushed it to a prominent place 
on the political agenda and therefore put pressure on state and local governments to take action.  
Katz and Bernstein (1998) argue that broad-based coalitions are being formed among a diverse 
set of interest groups, all of which, in Katz and Bernstein’s view, have something to lose as 
sprawl accelerates.  “These constituencies reject the conventional wisdom that current growth 
patterns are inevitable – the result only of invisible market forces and consumer preferences.  
Rather, they are focusing more on the role that government policies – spending program, tax 
expenditures, and regulatory and administrative actions – play in shaping our communities and, 
by extension, our lives (Katz and Bernstein, 1998, p 5).”  Leo et al. (1998) discuss in detail the 
various interest groups that have found common ground in their concern over sprawl: local 
businesses because they see the consequences of sprawl as detrimental to the local business 
climate and view smart growth as a means of opening up development opportunities, 
environmentalists who have come to realize that policies that control sprawl are in line with their 
growing interests in the urban environment, and agricultural interests because anti-sprawl 
policies are seen as a means of limiting the conversation of farm land as well as the pressures 
that urban development place on the activities of surrounding farms.   
Sprawl has also become an issue high on the public’s agenda.  For example, in a Pew 
Center for Civic Journalism national survey in October 1999, sprawl and crime were ranked first 
as the most important problems facing the respondent’s community (Williams 2000).  Sprawl is 
ranked as more of a problem among suburbanites, whites, and those with higher education. 
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This political pressure is forcing state and local governments  to address sprawl and the 
consequences of current development patterns.  The interest groups have lobbied governments to 
control sprawl through the use of growth management policies, impact fees, reduction of 
residential growth, and the purchase of land to preserve open space.  By one count, in 2001, there 
were 240 smart growth initiatives being considered across the county (Gosling, 2001).10 
Policies to address sprawl can be broadly categorized into two groups.  The first set of 
policies is aimed at directly preventing sprawl, and include growth controls and regional growth 
management.  The second set includes policies that are intended to discourage sprawl by 
correcting market failures by providing proper incentives and eliminating market-distorting 
public programs and policies. 
A.  Regulatory policies 
Growth control policies implicitly assume that sprawl and its consequences are the result 
of population growth.  Thus, the argument goes, by limiting growth sprawl can be controlled.  
However, growth control policies have largely been discredited as short sighted and ineffective 
(Downs 1994).  
Growth management policies, which aim to direct growth to certain areas and away from 
others, have been strongly endorsed, particularly by planners (Nelson, 1999, 2000).  The policies 
include regional planning or regional review of local planning and zoning,11 restricting or 
                                                          
10 
 For a summary of many of the policies that have been adopted by state and local governments to restrict 
the spatial expansion of cities see Brueckner (2001b). 
11 
Gale (1992) discusses the characteristics of eight state-sponsored growth management programs, while 
Glickfeld and Levine (1992) discuss the adoption of such programs in California. 
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steering development to areas that are served by appropriate public infrastructure, urban growth 
boundaries, and green belts.12  Several states have enacted legislation requiring regional 
planning, although the strength of these laws varies widely across states (Gale, 1992).  Oregon 
established the most widely noted urban growth boundary around Portland in 1973 (Abbott, 
1997), but growth boundaries have also been established around other cities (Lang and 
Hornbury, 1997; Easterly, 1992).  Green belts have been created in Seattle and Boulder (Nelson, 
1986).    
As we discussed above, and as most students of urban land markets agree, urban land 
markets are not perfectly competitive, and thus development patterns are not economically 
efficient.  Proponents of growth management policies argue, at least implicitly, that the solution 
to this inefficiency is through control of the development process.   Such policies as growth 
boundaries are, however, very blunt policy instruments.  Growth boundaries essentially replace 
market determination of how the boundaries of an urban area are set or adjusted to accommodate 
population growth with a planner’s vision of the most desirable pattern of development.  If 
growth boundaries are drawn tightly around the developed area, or not allowed to expand with 
increases in population, then development is constrained to a land mass that can be too 
restrictive.  On the other hand, the boundary could be drawn so far out that it has no effect on 
development patterns.     
In 1979, Mills (1979) noted that there had been very little scholarly analysis of land-use 
controls, by which he meant zoning.  The same could be said today regarding growth 
                                                          
12 
Growth boundaries and green belts are ways to restrict the geographic expansion of urban development. 
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management tools such as growth boundaries.  Hence we know very little about the effects of 
urban growth boundaries.    
From a theoretical perspective, since growth boundaries, if binding, reduce the supply of 
land available for development, they should result in an increase in the price of land throughout 
the urban area, an increase in residential density, and an increase in the concentration of 
commercial development in the central city.  There is some empirical evidence that residential 
density in Portland has increased and trip times have been reduced, but at the expense of an 
increase in housing prices (Nelson, 1999).  Nelson, et al. (2002) reviewed the literature on the 
effect of growth management policies on land and housing prices, and found that land prices are 
positively affected by urban growth boundaries.  However, they argue that the increase in land 
value might be due to an increase in housing demand resulting from the increased desirability of 
the urban environment in communities that control sprawl, and not just from restrictions on the 
availability of land. 
B.  Policies to correct market imperfections and misguided government policies 
An alternative approach to growth management is to adopt policies that correct the 
imperfections that lead to sprawl.   We consider each of the causes of sprawl and identify 
possible policies (all of which are discussed at length by others) to address each cause. 
Open space is undervalued 
There are two issues associated with open land: the land on the urban fringe and interior 
open space.  Consider land on the urban fringe.  As discussed above, if the social value of open 
space on the urban fringe exceeds the market price, then more land will be converted from open 
space/agricultural use to urban development than is socially optimal.  An obvious policy is to 
adopt a development tax set equal to the external costs of converting agricultural land to 
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developed land.  In other words, impose a tax equal to the dollar value of the social benefits to 
residents from the open space that would be eliminated by the development.   
The obvious difficulty is determining the social value of land that may be converted from 
agricultural use to development purposes.  It is unlikely that a uniform development tax would be 
appropriate for all land in all urban areas.  It is likely that certain types of land will have greater 
social value; for example, a tract of land that contains a river may have greater social value than 
an open field.  Furthermore, to the extent that the value of open space accrues to all residents, 
i.e., the externality is of a public good variety, then the development tax should increase with the 
population of the area. 
There have been very few efforts to estimate the social value of open space.  Lopez, 
Shah, and Altobello (1994) use data from previous studies to calculate the marginal social value 
of open space and find values that range from $12 to $103 per acre depending on the location. 
One method that is currently being used to measure social values is contingent valuation, 
a method that relies on individual responses to questions about their willingness to pay for a 
reduction in an externality.13 Brueckner (2001b) argues that the methods available to estimate 
such social values are not sufficiently creditable that they can be a reliable basis for policy.  
Thus, in setting such a development tax, a policy maker may just as easily set too low or too high 
a tax, both of which would produce economic inefficiencies.  It is not clear, however, whether 
imposing no tax would be socially preferred to levying a tax that may be calculated incorrectly.  
An alternative to taxing development is to subsidize farmers, e.g., by reducing property 
taxes, to encourage them not to sell their land to developers.  Every state already has a program 
                                                          
13 
For a discussion of contingent valuation see Diamond and Hausman (1994). 
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that in one way or another reduces property taxes on certain agricultural land.  These programs 
include applying a lower assessment ratio on agricultural land, using use value rather than fair 
market value, and levying reduced tax rates in return for long-term agreements not to convert the 
use of the land.  Studies of the effect of use-value assessment on the retardation of farm land 
conversions have found the impact to be slight; see  Chicoine, Sonka, and Doty (1982) and the 
references they cite.  More recently however, Morris (1998) found that preferential assessment of 
farmland reduced the loss of farmland by about 10 percent relative to the base case.  But the 
issue of determining the appropriate magnitude of the subsidy remains.  
The above policy is concerned with the pace at which agricultural/open land on the urban 
fringe is converted to developed uses.  But there clearly is a desire to retain open space within 
the urban area.  Land for public open space should be acquired by the government.  However, 
since parks are a public good and if they are provided by multiple local governments, park space 
may be under supplied.  Small local governments will consider the benefits to their taxpayers, 
who are a small percentage of the metropolitan area’s population.  Because each local 
government will face the full price of acquiring land, it will likely purchase less open space than 
is socially optimal.  Thus, there may be a role for a regional government in the provision of 
public open space. 
While public parks are one form of open space, privately owned common areas are 
another.  It is argued, for example, that instead of building 10 houses, each on half acre lots, it 
would be environmentally advantageous if the houses were clustered on 2 acres, with 3 acres set 
aside for common open space.  To preserve a set of geographically dispersed private open spaces 
within the interior of the urban area, however, would seem to require a very complicated 
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developmental tax or subsidy policy.  Such a policy would have to reflect the size, the location, 
and the environmental sensitivity of multiple tracts of open space.  
Distortions caused by the property tax 
If the property tax results in distortions leading to excessive expansion of the urban area, 
an obvious policy option is to replace the current property tax with a land value tax.  While land 
value taxation is used in several countries, there is no jurisdiction in the United States that has 
shifted to a land value tax.  Several jurisdictions have adopted a split rate property tax in which 
land is taxed at a higher rate than improvements.  A study by Oates and Schwab (1997) found 
that the split rate property tax in Pittsburgh may have lead to increased development in the 
central city. Land value taxation has been extensively discussed elsewhere (Netzer, 1998; Bahl 
and Linn, 1992; Tideman, 1998) and thus is not further pursued here. 
Mispricing of public infrastructure 
The economic solution to inappropriate pricing of public infrastructure is to charge new 
development the full cost of providing the infrastructure.  In an effort to impose such costs, many 
local governments impose impact fees on new developments.  Typically, the impact fees are 
calculated by a formula derived from estimates of the differences in the cost of public 
infrastructure for different types of development.  Altshuler and Gómez-IbáZez (1993), who 
provide an extensive discussion of impact fees and other forms of development exactions, point 
out that many of the attempts to estimate these costs are flawed.  Furthermore, impact fees are 
usually based on average costs, not marginal costs.  Thus, impact fees are usually the same for an 
infill development that simply has to connect to the existing water and sewer systems and for a 
development on the urban fringe that requires an extension of the public infrastructure.  The 
appropriate cost concept is the marginal infrastructure cost of the development.  Thus, while 
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impact fees are widely used, their design is often inconsistent with economically efficient pricing 
of public infrastructure.  
On the theoretical side, Breuckner (1997) explores the effects of three different schemes 
for financing infrastructure required by new development.  The first scheme is impact fees, 
where the incremental cost is borne by the developer.  The second scheme is an arrangement 
under which the infrastructure cost is shared among all landowners and is paid at the time of 
development.  The third scheme is like the second one, except the cost is financed by infinite-
maturity bonds.  He analyzes the three schemes in an urban growth model.  He finds that impact 
fees restrict growth over the other two options as long as the marginal infrastructure cost is 
greater than the average cost and the population growth rate is less than the interest rate.  
There has been little empirical work on the effect of impact fees.  Other than a paper by 
Skidmore and Peddle (1998), who found that impact fees in DuPage County, Illinois, reduced 
residential development, we found no recent empirical analysis of the effect of impact fees on 
development patterns.  Yinger (1998) cites two studies that explore the effect of impact fees on 
the price of housing.  Both studies obtain the surprising result that the price of a house increases 
by 2 to 3 times the value of the impact fee.  The implication is that there is substantial over 
shifting of impact fees to the purchaser of the home.   
Mispricing of road use 
Individuals make choices about commuting based on the private costs of travel such as 
the cost of time.  Since commuters do not bear the costs of congestion and air pollution imposed 
on others, they have no incentive to consider these costs.  For example, when another car enters 
traffic during rush hour, it further slows the flow of traffic, thereby increasing the time everyone 
else has to spend commuting.  But the driver considers only his commute time, not the effect he 
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has on everyone else.  Because of this situation, individuals choose to drive longer distances than 
are optimal. One solution to this problem is to charge drivers for the cost they impose on other 
drivers, i.e., to impose congestion fees.  
Optimal congestion fees should be set equal to the costs that the driver imposes on 
everyone else.  The appropriate fee depends on the volume of traffic on the segment of the 
transportation system used.  The toll should not be imposed just for the use of highways, since 
congestion also occurs on surface streets, and imposing a toll just on the use of highways would 
encourage drivers to shift from the highway to surface streets.  The congestion toll provides an 
incentive for individuals to shorten the commuting trip, to shift to a time when the toll is lower, 
and to switch to an alternative mode of transportation.   
Much research has been directed at determining the appropriate magnitude of a 
congestion toll.  Decorla-Souza and Kane (1992), for example, estimate that the marginal social 
cost of congestion is between $0.34 to $0.56 (in 2000 prices) per vehicle mile, while Small 
(1997) estimates that the air pollution cost of urban transportation is between $0.007 and $0.037 
per vehicle mile.  Congestion fees are used in several places, particularly outside the United 
States, and there are a variety of ways that they can be imposed, some more practical than others, 
and some more politically acceptable than others (Small, et al. 1989).   
One effect of congestion fees should be to reduce the number of miles traveled, which 
should also result in a reduction in air pollution.  To the extent that commuting trips are directed 
to the CBD, then reductions in commuting distance imply residing closer to the CBD, which in 
turn implies greater density.  However, not all work sites are located in the CBD but are spread 
throughout the metropolitan area.  Suppose that employment centers remain fixed and 
individuals move their place of residences in order to be closer to their particular place of 
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employment.  In that situation will density increase and will the developed area be smaller?   If 
more individuals commute into the CBD than reverse commute, then this rearranging of 
residences should result in an increase in the central city population.  At the same time, 
individuals will locate closer to other employment centers, increasing density around those 
centers.  However, it is not clear that the urban area will be smaller, although there may be places 
within the urban area that will be less developed.   
Related to the use of the transportation system is the cost of parking at work.  Free 
parking encourages commuting.  Requiring firms to charge employees for parking, or to pay 
employees who do not use the parking lot, would correct the distortion caused by free parking.  
The effect would be to reduce the number of commuters, thereby reducing congestion.  
Competition among jurisdictions 
Jurisdictional competition for tax base, either in the form of commercial development or 
housing types that contribute more in taxes than they cost in services, is thought to cause sprawl. 
This would occur if jurisdictions at or beyond the urban boundary provide incentives that lead to 
land being developed sooner than would be economically efficient. 
Such competition could be reduced by implementing a tax base or tax revenue sharing 
arrangement within the urban and ex-urban areas.  The principal example of tax base sharing is 
the program in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, implemented in the 1970s.  Under 
this legislation, in the Twin Cities area 40 percent of the increase in commercial-industrial 
property tax value goes into a regional pool to be shared by all taxing jurisdictions in the area.  
The sharing formula is based directly on population and inversely on relative property tax base 
per capita. 
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Tax base sharing was enacted to reduce fiscal disparities14 and to encourage more 
sensible land use decisions.  To the extent that a jurisdiction’s tax base does not increase by the 
full property value of the businesses that locate within its boundaries, inter-jurisdictional 
competition for non-residential tax base should be reduced.   With the Twin Cities program, local 
governments still compete for the 60 percent of the increase in the commercial-industrial base 
that is not shared.    
Another tax base sharing program is illustrated by the Hackensack Meadowlands 
Development and Reclamation Act in New Jersey.  This program differs from the Minnesota 
program in how the shared tax base pool is distributed.  There are three factors used.  First, 
jurisdictions that take tracts of land off of their property tax roll for public purposes (e.g., 
wetlands) receive in-lieu-of-tax payments. Second, a municipality gets a payment for land zoned 
for residential purposes to compensate for increased student enrollments.  Finally, the remaining 
shared tax base is allocated on the basis of land area.  By tying the distribution to actual land use, 
the tax base sharing program should have more influence on land use decisions than does the 
Minnesota sharing arrangement. 
There has been little research on whether tax base sharing has had an effect on land use 
decisions.  In one published paper, Reschovsky (1980) reports that he found little evidence that 
tax base sharing had an effect on land use patterns; but the Minnesota program was still 
relatively new at the time of the study.  Luce (1998), however, draws the same conclusion, 
                                                          
14 
Fisher (1981) and Fox (1981) discuss the flaws in the design of the Minnesota program in terms of how it 
addresses fiscal disparities. 
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noting that the use of tax increment financing suggests that local competition for business is still 
intense. 
A second approach to tax competition is to reduce the number of local governments.  The 
greater the number of local governments, the more likely it is that they will try to compete for tax 
base and try to exclude households with high service costs.  Thus, reducing the number of local 
governments or shifting certain services to regional governments, should reduce this form of 
competition.  
To the extent that this incentive is operable, we should expect that metropolitan areas 
with few relatively large jurisdictions should have experienced less sprawl then in metropolitan 
areas with a large number of smaller jurisdiction in which the well-to-do are able to isolate 
themselves.  Dye and McGuire (2000) find some evidence that metropolitan areas with a greater 
number of local governments are more sprawled.   
While such schemes may reduce the incentive of high income households to move to the 
urban fringe, the likelihood of implementing such schemes is very low since political opposition 
would likely be fierce.  Orfield (1998) provides an account of the political struggle to implement 
tax base sharing in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area and argues that to pass such legislation requires 
that there be more winners than losers.  Orfield (1997) argues that a coalition of the central city 
and older, inner-ring suburbs, should be able to find sufficient common ground and be 
sufficiently large to get legislation passed. 
Zoning and subdivision ordinances   
It has been widely argued that existing zoning and land use regulations create incentives 
for sprawl.  Thus, the obvious solution is to change these laws and ordinances (Downs, 1994).  
Another option is regional coordination and rationalization of local land use planning.  Such 
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centralization of growth management or mandated changes in local zoning ordinances is opposed 
by local jurisdictions since they do not want to give up local control of growth. 
 
VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
The finances of state and local governments can be affected by sprawl in many ways.  
The costs of providing highway and street networks, public transit, water and sewer 
infrastructure, and many city services such as police, fire, sanitation and EMS services increase 
as density falls and the urban area increases for a given population.  The level and geographic 
distribution of the property tax base may also be affected by sprawl.  In addition, state and local 
governments may be called upon to correct market imperfections and misguided government 
policies that lead to sprawl. 
The two most important market imperfections associated with sprawl are that the social 
value of open space may be greater than the private value and that the social costs of commuting 
may exceed the private costs.  Policies to address the former include fees or taxes on 
development, subsidies to farmers, and public acquisition of land at the urban fringe or open land 
in the interior of the urban area.  Congestion fees are the obvious response to the external costs 
imposed by drivers when they enter congested highway networks.  State and local governments 
have all of these tools at their disposal. 
It can be argued that local government reliance on the property tax also contributes to 
sprawl both because the property tax results in less dense development than a land tax and 
because it results in average cost pricing of public infrastructure for new development.  Shifting 
toward a land tax and imposing properly calculated impact fees would address these potential 
self-inflicted causes of sprawl. 
 32
Finally, through the proliferation of local governments and the zoning laws exercised by 
them, regional cooperation to address sprawl can be difficult.  Regional government and a 
centralization of land use decisions are the obvious, although highly unpopular, solutions to 
sprawl.  If the perception is that the social costs of sprawl have become unacceptable, then state 
and local governments will be compelled to consider a combination of many of the policies 
discussed herein.   
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Table 1. Percentage Change in Density, 1982-1997 
Percentage change Number of metropolitan areas 
>25% decline 88 
10-25% decline 138 
0-10% decline 39 
0-10% increase 9 
>10% increase 7 
Source: Fulton et al (2001) p. 5  
 
 
Table 2. Percent Change in Urbanized Land and Population, 1982-1997 
Census Region Change in Land Change in Population Ratio of percentage change in 
land to percentage change in 
population 
West 48.4% 32.2% 1.52 
South 59.6% 22.2% 2.68  
 38
Midwest 32.2% 7.1%  4.54 
Northeast 39.1% 6.9% 5.67 
Source: Fulton, et. al, 2001 
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Table 3.  Population, Land Area, and Population Density of the Twenty Largest Urbanized Areas 
 
   
 
Percentage change, 1960-1990 
Population density of 
urbanized area  
(1000s per sq. mi.) 
Rust Belt  
(Pop. 2000) 
Urban 
population 
Urbanized 
land area 
Central city 
population 
Suburban 
population 
1960 1990 Change 
1 New York, NY 
20,119,458 
14 57 -6 27 7.46 5.41 -2.05 
2 Chicago, IL 
8,272,768 
14 65 -22 68 6.21 4.29 -1.92 
3 Boston, MA 
6,057,826 
15 73 -18 28 4.68 3.11 -1.56 
4 Philadelphia, PA 
5,100,931 
16 95 -21 39 6.09 3.63 -2.47 
5 Washington, DC 
4,923,153 
86 177 -21 126 5.31 3.56 -1.75 
6 Detroit, MI 
4,441,551 
5 53 -38 38 4.83 3.30 -1.53 
7 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 
2,968,806 
51 62 -20 123 2.10 1.96 -0.14 
8 St. Louis, MO 
2,603,607 
17 125 -47 46 5.16 2.67 -2.49 
9 Baltimore, MD 
2,552,994 
33 169 -22 87 6.44 3.19 -3.25 
10 Pittsburgh, PA 
2,358,695 
-7 48 -39 -3 3.44 2.16 -1.28 
Sun Belt        
1 Los Angeles, CA 
9,519,338 
76 43 41 51 4.74 5.80 1.06 
2 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 
5,221,801 
123 57 40 246 1.56 2.22 0.66 
3 Houston, TX 
4,177,646 
155 173 81 281 2.65 2.46 -0.18 
4 San Francisco-Oakland, 
CA 
4,123,740 
49 54 1 66 4.27 4.15 -0.12 
5 Atlanta, GA 
4,112,198 
181 362 -19 211 3.13 1.90 -1.23 
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6 Phoenix, AZ 
3,251,876 
263 198 125 335 2.22 2.71 0.48 
7 San Diego, CA 
2,813,833 
181 150 94 202 3.03 3.40 0.37 
8 Seattle, WA 
2,414,616 
102 147 -7 166 3.63 2.97 -0.66 
9 Tampa, FL 
2,395,997 
173 197 2 228 2.87  2.63 -0.24 
10 Miami, FL 
2,253,362 
125 93 23 145 4.66 5.43 0.77 
 
Notes: 
20 largest urbanized areas by 1990 population. 
Central city is the city or cities named. 
Suburban is the difference between the urbanized area’s corresponding metropolitan area and the 
central city.  1999 metropolitan boundaries are used for both 1960 and 1990 data. 
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